Any ceasefire may be weak because tensions and skepticism remain high. If one party does not sincerely intend to pursue a negotiated solution, the whole process is threatened. In addition, ceasefires are often manipulated as tools of political or strategic advantage. For example, a party may use a ceasefire to build up its war combat capability and/or maneuver its armed forces to stronger tactical positions. One party may also undertake other provocative actions that are not compatible with the spirit of a ceasefire to weaken the position of its adversary, perhaps inciting the other party to break the ceasefire, resulting in condemnation and pressure from third parties. A ceasefire is usually more limited than a broader ceasefire, which is a formal agreement to end the fighting. Ceasefires can be used by the parties to cover up the rearmament or repositioning of forces, and they usually fail when they are described as “failed ceasefires”;  However, successful ceasefires can be followed by a ceasefire and then peace treaties. On January 15, 1973, U.S. President Richard Nixon ordered a ceasefire of airstrikes in northern Vietnam. The decision came after Henry Kissinger, the president`s national security adviser, returned from Paris, France, to Washington, D.C., with a peace proposal. Combat operations continued in southern Vietnam. On 27 January 1973, all parties to the Vietnam War sign a ceasefire as a prelude to the Paris Peace Agreement.
During World War I, on December 24, 1914, there was an unofficial ceasefire on the Western Front when France, Britain and Germany celebrated Christmas. Reports claim that the unofficial ceasefire took place during the week before Christmas and that British and German troops exchanged greetings and seasonal songs between their trenches.  The ceasefire was short, but spontaneous. From the moment german soldiers lit Christmas trees, it spread rapidly on the Western Front.  One report describes developments in these terms: this report uses primary data to analyse local ceasefires negotiated in Syria in early 2014 and contains brief case studies from Homs, Barzeh, Mu`adamiyya, Yarmouk and other localities. It examines the dynamics that characterise the negotiation and implementation of these local agreements and assesses the extent of their humanitarian impact and their contribution to wider political achievements. The report is not in the public domain. Ceasefires are available in different forms and lengths. . . .